HomePoliticsAmerican Global Health Aid Isn’t Dead. It’s Changing.

American Global Health Aid Isn’t Dead. It’s Changing.

Americans might have assumed that their country was out of the business of promoting global health. On his first day in office, President Trump announced the United States’ withdrawal from the World Health Organization and abruptly “paused” foreign aid. Over the following weeks, Elon Musk took a chain saw to the U.S. Agency for International Development.

In the wake of these actions, reporters documented shortages of tuberculosis, malaria and H.I.V. drugs, widespread clinic closures and the abandonment of patients enrolled in medical trials. Many programs never resumed, and researchers predicted that hundreds of thousands of avoidable deaths would occur in the first year alone. Assessing whether this came true is complicated by the fact that programs tracking health outcomes were among those the U.S. ended.

Congress had originally allocated about $10 billion to the government’s main global health programs, or roughly $30 per U.S. resident, to run one of the world’s most effective foreign aid efforts. But even after the wave of staff terminations and grant cancellations, Congress still wanted that money to be spent. To direct the funds, last September, the U.S. State Department released a new plan: the America First Global Health Strategy.

This plan endorsed some goals that experts have long championed regardless of political fealty, such as having recipient countries take more responsibility for running and funding the programs.

But it also had a distinctly Trumpian element that seemed shocking to observers of the foreign aid world: The money had significant — and unusual — strings attached. Countries that receive aid were invited to negotiate “America First” agreements with the United States “that promote our national interests while saving millions of lives,” according to a letter from Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

What does this look like in practice? A country that wants aid, for instance, is now asked to share with the United States pathogen samples and access to its health data systems. And in at least several cases, as a health aid agreement was being discussed, the United States was also separately negotiating to gain access to a country’s strategic minerals or to have the country accept U.S. deportees from other nations. State Department representatives have said that these negotiations are not linked, but officials from a number of countries said they had felt pressured to accept terms that were uncomfortable to them.

Many people in countries that receive aid are realists, in that they assume that donors have ulterior motives. Previous efforts to help were never purely selfless. For decades, Democratic and Republican administrations alike have embraced a duality of global public health: framing it in terms of altruism to those in need while also going to lengths to explain to Congress and the American people why promoting a healthier world benefits America.

What, if anything, then, is different about the Trump administration’s insistence that foreign aid dollars deliver a “return for the American people”?

In 2005, I was an aid worker a few years out of medical school when a devastating earthquake struck Pakistan. U.S.A.I.D. was seeking organizations to implement a $28.5 million, four-year health care recovery program. The agency, in its request for applications, said it would select districts based on the extent of earthquake damage, but also on “geopolitical importance to U.S. Government” and “public relations optic.”

More than two decades later, I still remember reading this passage and being struck by its incongruity with the rest of a 46-page technical document focused on improving community health. Aid workers were far from naïve. We knew that donors had their own priorities and that our presence fostered good will toward our home countries too.

Still, it was jarring to read these words from U.S.A.I.D. while spending time with people who had barely survived disaster and were now living under tarps. In the late 20th century, independence had become a core value of humanitarian action. This meant that aid groups responded to people’s needs, not to countries’ political, economic or military objectives.

For governments funding the aid, however, the assistance has long been tied to strategic goals. In an earlier era, aid was often a colonial project. European powers had strong reasons to spend money on health care in lands they had taken over: to keep subjugated workers on the job.

Around the turn of the 20th century, the United States began leading efforts in the Americas to control diseases, including malaria and yellow fever, that were inhibiting trade and travel and frustrating efforts to build the Panama Canal. The U.S. government was a driving force in the creation of the Pan American Health Organization, and later the World Health Organization.

During the Cold War, under Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, food aid was positioned as both a way to dispose of surplus U.S. production and to expand markets overseas, in addition to helping “friendly nations.” Congress established U.S.A.I.D. in 1961 to consolidate foreign aid efforts, not least out of an appreciation for aid’s soft power in the fight against Communism.

Not everyone in Washington was convinced, though. Beginning in the 1970s, Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina pushed an isolationist view. He famously referred to foreign aid as pouring money down a “rat hole,” calling it a waste of taxpayers’ resources and a conduit for liberal agendas. Helms tried to abolish U.S.A.I.D. during the Clinton administration. Congress also considered merging the agency into the State Department, in part to give the secretary of state “more direct control over all tools of U.S. foreign policy,” as a Congressional Research Service report put it.

But in the early 21st century, a bipartisan agreement began to emerge that global health aid was a necessary force for good, in and of itself. This was a direct response to the devastating AIDS epidemic, which has claimed an estimated 44 million lives around the world.

AIDS drugs had become miraculous lifesavers in rich countries but were unavailable in poorer countries. Even Helms, who had blamed homosexuality for the spread of AIDS and opposed funding for research on the disease, was eventually moved. In 2000, he helped write legislation that authorized funds to support AIDS treatment in low-income countries. “I’m so ashamed that I’ve done so little,” he later said at a conference organized by Samaritan’s Purse, a Christian aid organization that participates in the longstanding tradition of missionary and religious-backed global heath assistance.

In 2003, President George W. Bush made the stunning announcement that the United States would commit $15 billion over five years fighting the disease abroad. It was “for a clear reason, directly rooted in our founding,” he said. “We believe in the value and dignity of every human life.” The program became known as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR.

For years, the C.I.A. had warned that the wave of AIDS deaths could cause global destabilization. However, just two years after the Sept. 11 attacks, humanitarian justifications for PEPFAR featured far more prominently than arguments that it would bolster national security. For years to come, the right and the left supported global health using a rhetoric of compassion and expecting a return on investment in the currency of human lives. PEPFAR still accounts for close to half of the government’s global health aid budget.

An irony of the Trump administration’s more transactional approach to global aid is that it risks losing not only important gains in human health, but also the good will and influence long reaped from U.S. investments. For example, America no longer has a voice in W.H.O. negotiations that could determine how quickly U.S. companies and universities gain access to pathogen information and samples from across the globe in future outbreaks.

In the year since the America First Global Health Strategy was first unveiled, the administration has shared few details on implementation. But the plan is off to a rocky start, according to outside analysts and advocacy groups, among them Public Citizen, which had to sue under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain copies of some of the bilateral deals. Emily Bass, a writer and former State Department consultant, has also revealed details of the initiatives, such as that the U.S. government was asking countries to share specimens of new pathogens that could cause epidemics.

The government’s goal was to sign the bulk of the America First health deals by last December. But it reached agreements with just 14 out of 71 recipient countries. The number has now increased to 36, and at least three countries have explicitly rejected the offers. At a recent meeting with international partners, Brad Smith, a State Department adviser, said the number of deals made represented $14 billion of United States investment, which he called “tremendous progress” in a short time. Those that have been completed have faced difficulties: Kenya’s government was the first country to sign one, only to face two lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of requirements to share data on patients and pathogens with the United States. The courts are allowing implementation to begin while the cases proceed.

Similar provisions were reportedly dropped from an America First health agreement with Zambia, which had objected to them. (U.S. officials say that in all cases, the intention was never for the United States to collect personal health information but rather data on the program’s results.)

Zambian officials also balked after the State Department described aid to the country as being made “in exchange for collaboration in the mining sector,” among other terms. After months of delay, the countries recently signed the health agreement and are still discussing mining deals.

Dr. Atul Gawande was U.S.A.I.D.’s assistant administrator for global health under the Biden administration. He says it is a misnomer to call the America First approach to global health aid “transactional.” He prefers “extractive and predatory.”

“We made transactional deals all the time when I was in the office,” Gawande says. These were expectations around “common goals,” he said, such as reducing child mortality and corruption.

Dr. Mark Dybul, who helped design and later led PEPFAR, says a better way to look at the current U.S. approach to global health is as “a model of mutual benefit.” If countries identify spaces in which they have mutual interests, he says, “then everyone wins.” That could include mining in some cases, because “countries also need extraction of their resources in order for them to grow economically.”

In the end, what will matter most is not the America First Global Health Strategy’s rhetoric, but rather what it aims to accomplish, and whether it will succeed. A major aspect of all of the bilateral agreements available to date involves recipient governments’ agreeing to spend more of their own money on their health systems, a goal shared by African heads of state.

Governments should use more “public resources to finance their people’s health care,” says Tolbert Nyenswah, a former Liberian government health official who now serves as country director for the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in South Sudan.

Only a few years after PEPFAR started as an emergency program, American officials began planning for some countries to take more responsibility for AIDS prevention and treatment. The first Trump administration took steps to promote country self-reliance by increasing the proportion of health programs implemented by local entities, an effort that continued under Biden. The successes showed that “even more radical transition is possible on a fairly short time frame,” says William Steiger, who served as U.S.A.I.D.’s chief of staff during Trump’s first term. Still, for some countries, a rapid shift to self-sufficiency is unlikely. Smith, the State Department adviser, said at the recent meeting that the agreements vary based on national abilities.

“The opportunity for a new approach, a transition to something exciting and different is there,” Dybul says. “It’s going to be based on how we all decide to work with each other again.”

Congress’s actions matter, too. The funding levels in the bilateral health deals obtained to date call for major reductions in aid, according to an analysis by Public Citizen and Partners in Health, and a separate review by the Center for Global Development. For now, however, despite the Trump administration’s proposals for sharp cuts, legislators have appropriated only slightly less money for global health. A Democrat-controlled Congress may be even more willing to fund development aid and scrutinize how the administration is restructuring it.

In recent weeks, the State Department announced a flurry of funding awards for global health. At least one large contract went to a company that had no international development experience, but had ties to the Trump family, and the administration intends to shift many millions of dollars away from reproductive care. Despite reports of the end of American global health aid, the tradition isn’t over. But it is evolving.

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