Analysis: How important is Syria’s return to the Arab League?

Syria return to the arab leaguewith the assistance of President Bashar al-Assad at Friday’s summit in Saudi Arabia, it will be mostly about symbolism. However, it reflects a major shift in the way regional actors view the reality of the al-Assad government’s survival, in ways that are disagree with the west.

More than 11 years after Syria was suspended from the pan-Arab institution in the wake of the brutal crackdown on opposition protesters and the ensuing war in the country, the emerging consensus in Arab capitals today, rightly or wrongly, is that addressing Syria’s problems requires a compromise with Damascus.

Understanding the Syrian crisis as an Arab problem, the Arab states are determined to pursue Arab strategies to overcome the toxic and destabilizing impacts of this conflict in the region. According to analysts, they hope that by mitigating the conflict, they can begin to reverse associated drug trafficking networks, refugee crises, weakened border security and the intensified role of Iranian forces and Tehran-backed militias in Syria.

Regaining full membership in the Arab League marks a major victory for Syria’s government, according to Aron Lund, a Century International fellow and Middle East analyst.

“Being allowed to return shows that Syria is reintegrating into the region and that other Arab leaders are confident that Assad is here to stay. So, it is a political victory for the Damascus government,” Lund told Al Jazeera. “In itself, it brings very few concrete changes. Syria desperately needs help and investment. The Arab League can’t offer any of that, but there are Persian Gulf states that can.”

Saudi Arabia as a regional heavyweight

A turning point in Syria’s reintegration into the diplomatic fold of the Arab world came earlier this year when Saudi Arabia began to move towards reconciliation with Damascus.

Both the earthquakes on February 6 and the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic agreement on March 10 accelerated Riyadh’s move toward renormalizing relations with the al-Assad regime. It is fair to conclude that Syria’s return to the Arab League only became feasible after Saudi Arabia changed its position.

Although some Arab states such as Qatar, Kuwait and Morocco have not returned to normal relations with Damascus and still maintain that the al-Assad government is illegitimate, Riyadh used its influence as a leader in the Arab and Islamic world to persuade them not to hinder the return from Syria. to the Arab League.

The move is pragmatic, with Riyadh and other Arab capitals choosing to deal with Damascus based on how they perceive their countries’ national interests.

From the perspective of many Arab governments, the current strategy of the United States and other Western powers to isolate Syria is untenable.

The thinking among many Arab officials is that such policies will only keep Damascus firmly in Iran’s orbit of influence and that Arab states may also try to bring Syria back into their fold by compromising with the al-Assad regime.

Syria’s government needs financial support and legitimacy, which Damascus believes could, at least eventually, reopen formal relations with Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Arab nations.

“(Al-)Assad is very pragmatic and takes money where it comes from,” Andreas Krieg, an associate professor in the Department of Defense Studies at King’s College London, said in an interview with Al Jazeera. “It doesn’t matter if he is from the Saudis, Iranians or Russians. In this context, the regime will do whatever is in its own interest. We have seen them being very confident in the way they engage with other Arab countries, especially Egypt, saying that we will do whatever is in the interest of Syria and that we are not making big concessions.”

In the short term, it is likely that Arab money will not immediately start flowing into Syria simply because of the al-Assad government’s return to the Arab League.

Western-imposed sanctions on Syria, especially Washington’s Caesar Act, are currently the biggest obstacle to investment by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab countries.

Experts agree that without members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) who can invest in Syria, it will be hard to imagine Damascus distancing itself from Iran.

“If no investments can be made in Syria outside of the limited scope of humanitarian assistance, and if sanctions remain without exception, as they are at the moment, there is no way for the UAE or Saudi Arabia to put up any money. in Syria and therefore provide the (al-) Assad regime with any incentive to move away from the Russians or the Iranians,” Krieg explained. “Similarly, why would they stop the Captagon trade if they are now losing a couple billion dollars every year from that drug trade and that loss can’t be offset by Gulf money?”

However, analysts believe that Abu Dhabi and Riyadh view Caesar’s sanctions as a temporary hurdle that Washington will remove or ease, though not necessarily anytime soon, with the Emiratis and Saudis assuming there will come a time when they can start to putting money into post-conflict Syria and leveraging their networks to gain greater geopolitical influence in the country.

Qatar and Kuwait

Having refrained from returning to normal relations with the al-Assad government, the position of Qatar and Kuwait is that Damascus has not taken any action that would warrant the rehabilitation of the Syrian regime.

“Qatar has positioned itself as the Arab world’s hardest-line opponent of the (al-)Assad regime,” Lund told Al Jazeera. “I have no doubt that it reflects the opinion of many in Doha, but there are also pragmatic and self-interested reasons for this position.”

Qatari officials frame his hardline anti-Assad stance as siding with the Arab people, social justice and grassroots movements, in opposition to autocratic Arab regimes. Given the historical roles that Doha and Kuwait City have played in the Middle East, their positions on the al-Assad government are easier to understand.

“Qatar and Kuwait have a different history in the region, with their aid going mainly toward development projects and institution building rather than regime support,” said Nabeel Khoury, a non-resident senior fellow at the Gulf International Forum and former head of mission. US deputy in Yemen, he told Al Jazeera. “Qatar, in particular, chooses to stay out of the axes and alliances that are forming, especially with regard to Israel, (and) is likely…to maintain its role as a mediator in regional conflicts and its pro-Palestinian policies.”

However, neither Qatar nor Kuwait obstructed Syria’s return to the Arab League and the two countries did not attend the May 7 meeting.

For Doha, there were concerns about how preventing an Arab consensus on Syria could have undermined Qatar’s relations with the Gulf countries and elsewhere in the Arab world. Qatar’s position towards the al-Assad government allows it to continue with a foreign policy that it considers pro-human rights, without unduly upsetting its fellow Arab states on the Syrian issue.

Following the al-Ula summit in January 2021, which resolved the 2017-21 Gulf crisis, Doha has avoided antagonizing its immediate neighbors in the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt. The Qataris “showed pragmatism” by not obstructing Syria’s return to the Arab League, according to Krieg. “They support Saudi Arabia’s efforts to become and reposition itself (Saudi Arabia) as the leader of the Arab world.”

“(Qatar) signaled its own opposition to the Arab League resolution, but went no further,” Lund explained. “It appears that there was no serious attempt by Qatar to stop the resolution, just a series of statements and leaks to the media to highlight Doha’s position.”

In fact, by not obstructing Syria’s return to the Arab League, Qatar was making a concession to Damascus.

But Qatar has no incentive to make any further concessions to the al-Assad government anytime soon, and there are good reasons to believe that Doha will be the last Arab capital to treat Syria’s government as legitimate.