Economic security and coverage in Southeast Asia | East Asia Forum

Author: Darren J. Lim, ANU

The coverage study arose because traditional security concepts of balancing and riding the bandwagon are insufficient to understand how smaller states are responding to the US-China rivalry. While there is no scholarly consensus on a definition, the coverage offers an alternative approach to categorizing the foreign and security policy choices exhibited by Southeast Asian countries.

In this context, coverage means sending signals that generate ambiguity on the extent of a state’s shared security interests with major rival powers, representing its interest in maintaining positive relations with both. While security interests are typically reflected in political decisions such as arms purchases, joint training exercises and security treaties, Washington and Beijing increasingly see economic policies as signs of friendship or animosity.

Australia learned this lesson in 2018 when it banned the Chinese company Huawei from its 5G network. Canberra stated that this decision only affected inmates network securitybut Beijing understood it not only as a sign of lack of trust but also of hostility. On the contrary, it was praised by the then President of the United States, Donald Trump.

Governments that have followed Australia often share fewer security interests with China compared to those that use Huawei’s 5G technology. Economic policy can now be a significant indicator of security alignment.

Economic and technological connectivity is becoming more and more ‘armed‘ and it is becoming a source of geopolitical power and vulnerability. The United States can affect Beijing’s battlefield capabilities by restricting semiconductor technology, while China has disrupted multiple bilateral trade relationseven with key US alliesin pursuit of strategic goals.

Armed interdependence means that governments mistrust the geopolitical and national security implications of existing and potential economic relationships. The way governments manage these economic relationships offers insight into their underlying security interests.

Washington and Beijing are expanding the scope of political domains and behaviors that affect national security. The Trump administration claimed that ‘economic security is national security‘, while US President Joe Biden’s National Security Adviser explained that keeping ‘the greatest possible advantage‘ in certain technologies it was a national security imperative.

The Chinese Communist Party is even more expansive in its’securitization of everything‘. China’s interests as an emerging power are naturally expanding, but his political system it means that the Party does not separate its interests from those of the nation. Therefore, any behavior, including economic policy, at home or abroad that may affect the Party’s political legitimacy is considered a threat to China’s national security.

Southeast Asian states want a stable geopolitical environment for focus on their economic development. They do not want to be forced to’take sides‘ in any hegemonic rivalry in which Washington or Beijing might conclude that the smaller state’s security interests conflict with theirs.

But if armed interdependence means that major powers perceive more economic and technological policies as zero-sum, the political space for coverage shrinks regardless of the smaller state’s motivation.

A government could choose Chinese telecommunications providers based solely on cost, speed of implementation, and quality, and be relatively carefree about national security risks. However, Washington could assess this as compromising defense or economic cooperation and back off. Alternatively, Beijing can judge hostile decisions to exclude chinese suppliers based on network security risks.

In the short and medium term, Washington and Beijing will continue their partial decoupling and vigorous competition in a range of critical and emerging technologies. These may include digital technologies, advanced materials and manufacturing, energy, and biotechnology. Given the perceived vulnerability of technological interdependence on both sides, a technology security dilemma — partial uncoupling between the superpowers is probably necessary for long-term strategic balance.

Maintaining a hedging strategy will require Southeast Asian states to position themselves economically within a partially decoupled system in a way that avoids taking sides. This will be challenging, especially when the great powers build walls to separate themselves economically and technologically.

Governments in Southeast Asia will have to make decisions regarding who provides technology products and the standards embedded in them. These options may have a strong zero-sum element.

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong argues that regional states must have confidence in exercising his agency shape your external environment. Coverage, especially to avoid taking sides, risks sidelining Southeast Asian states at arguably the most important geopolitical moment since their independence. Even if coverage is preferred, policymakers must be creative in order to actively and positively shape the regional order.

One area where affordable coverage can have a real impact is critical technology standards. Standards are historically developed and propagated by the most powerful countries. Their experts dominate international standards-setting bodies, and their companies embed these standards into their products, which are then adopted by default by buyers.

It is essential for technological standards interoperability — which means that the systems are compatible with each other. Technology standards must support interoperability by enabling the development of new products and technologies that can interface with existing systems. But in an age of technological decoupling, interoperability may be giving way to closed and fragmented systems.

individually or working collectively across ASEANcoverage by Southeast Asian states may require the enactment of technology standards that do not force countries to choose one technology ecosystem over another.

Darren J Lim is a Senior Lecturer at the Australian National University School of Politics and International Relations.

This article was developed based on the writer’s presentation in the Southeast Asia Regional geopolitical update at the Australian National University on May 1, 2023.