Ivo Daalder, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, is president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and host of the weekly podcast “World Review with Ivo Daalder.”
While spending the past week in Brussels, Berlin and London, meeting with European Union, NATO and other government officials, I was struck by a pervasive anxiety regarding the United States, particularly if polls predicting a Republican win in the midterm elections prove accurate.
Across the board, I heard two concerns: One was focused on how Washington’s growing attempt to decouple from China and tackle climate change was leading to a new protectionism — with fresh subsidies for U.S.-produced electric vehicles (EV) and batteries, and new constraints on semiconductors topping the list. The other concerned the growing fear that a Republican Congress could end critical U.S. support for Ukraine.
Europeans are right to feel uneasy about the direction of U.S. trade and foreign economic policy.
For all its embrace of allies and partners, President Joe Biden’s administration hasn’t done nearly enough to restore a sense of balance in its economic relations with allies in Europe and Asia. The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council is little more than a talking shop, with one top EU official asking, “Where’s the beef?” And the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework has little to show for itself.
Meanwhile, recent U.S. actions now point to a return to the unilateralism and protectionism characteristic of the previous administration of former President Donald Trump. Many in Europe had initially welcomed the renewed U.S. commitment to fighting climate change, but they now worry a fight that’s meant to be global in nature is pitting U.S. industrial policy and concerns over China, against the very allies and partners Washington needs to succeed.
These concerns are exemplified by the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which aims to curb inflation and promote clean energy. The IRA’s sweeping incentives to develop clean energy and electrify vehicles are currently closed off to European and Asian — though not North American — companies, despite the fact that the European EV market is open to U.S. produced cars.
The same is true for semiconductors. Washington’s decision barring all U.S. originated content in semiconductors from the Chinese market has caused much consternation — although extensive consultations prior to the announcement did somewhat ease overt criticism.
The underlying differences here are less about the ultimate objectives than how to achieve them. Europe is accelerating its own energy transition to wean itself off Russian fossil fuels, and it too faces stiff competition from Chinese firms, which benefit from generous state subsidies. Yet, rather than cooperating, so as to compete more effectively with China, U.S. policies are seen as pitting American companies against those in Europe and Asia.
Of course, Europe isn’t blameless either, as far too many — not least in Germany — are insisting that China remains a critical trading partner, despite all evidence to the contrary.
For example, having forced through the sale of a stake in Hamburg’s container port, Chancellor Olaf Scholz traveled to Beijing this week to meet with President Xi Jinping — a large delegation of business leaders in tow. Even as Berlin reduces its dependence on Russian gas, it’s deepening its dependence on the Chinese market — and it’s hardly alone in this.
Despite these frictions over trade and China, however, the officials I spoke with were universal in their praise for Biden and his administration’s handling of the war in Ukraine. The efforts to arm and support Kyiv, bolster NATO, and sanction and isolate Russia have succeeded thanks to close consultations and steadfast American leadership — but there’s growing concern that this may not last either.
Recent warnings by Republican House leader Kevin McCarthy, stating that his party will no longer write a “blank check” in support of Ukraine, have raised real fears that Kyiv may fall victim to deepening polarization in the U.S.
And there are, indeed, reasons to worry about how a Republican takeover of the House would affect continued financial commitment to support Ukraine. After all, 57 House Republicans — and 11 Republican Senators — voted against the last major aid package for Ukraine, reflecting the growing “American First” attitude among grassroots Republicans. And their numbers will likely grow with the election.
A new vote to support Ukraine would, therefore, have to rely on Democrats to achieve a majority — something past Republican speakers have been loath to do.
But when push comes to shove, support for Ukraine may prove different.
Despite warning that “people are gonna be sitting in a recession and they’re not going to write a blank check to Ukraine,” McCarthy himself has voted in favor of assisting the country. His Senate counterpart, Mitch McConnell, has also consistently led the fight for more military aid, and after McCarthy’s statement, called for “expediting” air defense, long-range rockets and humanitarian and economic support.
Republican opposition to supporting Ukraine is also widely out of step with American public opinion. A recent Chicago Council Survey found that nearly three-quarters of Americans support continued military and economic aid to Ukraine, with a strong majority (58 percent) saying that support should continue “as long as it takes,” even if food and fuel prices continue to rise as a result. (Though a more recent poll shows that Republicans increasingly believe the U.S. is doing too much in support of Ukraine.)
Finally, if the midterm results do call future House support for assistance into question, the Biden administration and Democratic congressional leaders will still have the option of pushing a large military and financial aid package through the lame-duck session that will follow the election, preceding the seating of the new Congress early next year.
Overall, the challenges we now face — whether from Russia, China or climate change — can only be met if the U.S. works with its allies and partners in Europe and Asia. The time for “America First” — or “Germany alone,” for that matter — has passed. It’s now time to come together.
