India’s policy in Southeast Asia

New Delhi: Earlier this month, the national diplomatic hubbub focused on the G20 Summit. However, apart from that, the Prime Minister also focused on India’s Look East policy and participated in the ASEAN and East Asia Summit in Indonesia, focusing on ways to counter China’s regional dominance.

The G20 Summit in New Delhi, held on September 9 and 10, was indeed a global image and branding exercise for the Centre.

An exercise in which Prime Minister Narendra Modi, G20 Sherpa Amitabh Kant and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar They were equally involved and committed and accomplished the task with finesse.

The icing on the cake was the adoption of the New Delhi Declaration, which was adopted unanimously at the summit.

However, Prime Minister Modi, as the leader of the Global South and keeping in mind India’s strategic and regional priorities, despite his strong commitment to the G20 Summit, undertook a whirlwind tour of the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, to attend the ASEAN and East Asia Summit.

This shows the Center’s priorities both regionally and globally. On the one hand, India hosted the prestigious G20 Summit but, on the other, it did not ignore its regional priorities and strategies.

Let’s take a look at the reasons why Modi flew to Jakarta to participate in these two events. In fact, India is becoming a strategic player in Southeast Asia.

It has promoted ties (diplomatic, commercial, defense and people-to-people) with almost all countries in the region, from Vietnam to the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei, Thailand, Singapore, Japan and South Korea .

Over the years, India signed an arms deal with Vietnam, supported the Philippines in sovereignty disputes with China in the South China Sea and has increased defense cooperation with Indonesia.

The way he has managed the balance of power policy in the region is a classic model of diplomacy. Basically, China’s aggressive stance in and around the South China Sea is uniting India and its partners in the region. Although these bilateral and multilateral relations have not transformed into formal alliances, the trend is clear. India’s regional forays will increasingly complement the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China in the coming years.

India initiated its Look East Policy in 1991, which transformed into an Act East policy in 2014, when India initiated a policy of proactive engagement in the region to avoid falling prey to Chinese domination. Under Prime Minister Modi, India has in recent years steadily strengthened key partnerships across Southeast Asia, particularly with countries along the Indo-Pacific maritime rim.

These measures are clearly designed to cooperate with Southeast Asian partners, who, in addition to supporting the rules-based international order, insist on regional norms of behavior in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness in the region.

Currently, India and Vietnam enjoy a “comprehensive strategic partnership” after Modi visited Vietnam in 2016. In contrast, the United States is only a “comprehensive partner” for Vietnam, two levels below India’s status. Washington has strived to elevate the partnership and President Joe Biden’s recent visit to Vietnam was part of this effort.

The Philippines, a long-standing treaty ally of the United States, has also expanded its security partnership with India.

Late last month, Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo visited New Delhi and met his Indian counterpart Jaishankar.

For the first time, India recognized the legitimacy of the 2016 arbitration ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in favor of the Philippines’ sovereignty claims over China in the South China Sea.

India has also remained committed to developing a security partnership with Indonesia. Indo-Indonesian defense relations received a boost in 2018, when Modi visited Jakarta and elevated relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership.

The two nations also began a new naval exercise, Samudra Shakti, which incorporated a warfare component. In addition, the two countries are also exploring possible cooperation in air forces.

Indonesia could also follow in the Philippines’ footsteps by purchasing BrahMos missiles.

India is also cooperating with Malaysia, building on an enhanced strategic partnership signed in 2015. Although Kuala Lumpur’s decision earlier this year to cancel a deal to buy Indian-made Tejas fighter jets may have hurt the partnership somewhat , the intention clearly remains to strengthen ties in line with upholding the mutual goal of maintaining the rules-based international order in the region, especially internationally recognized maritime boundaries and freedom of navigation, neither of which Beijing accepts.

Brunei is another emerging partner of India along the South China Sea. In 2021, the two nations renewed their defense agreement for five years and regularly participate in joint exercises, port visits by navy and coast guard ships, and official defense exchanges.

India’s strategic partnerships with Singapore and Thailand are also close and long-standing. Singapore regularly participates in bilateral exercises, high-level dialogues, visits and professional training with India. Modi visited Singapore twice in 2018 and, on the first trip, signed 35 memoranda of understanding on a range of economic and security issues.

In 2022, India and Thailand renewed their partnership and committed to further raising defense commitments, to include cybersecurity. Perhaps of greater importance is the financial aspect of your relationship. In a nod to New Delhi’s original Look East policy, Bangkok implemented its own Look West policy in 1997, in part to tap the huge Indian market. Additionally, Thailand and India are partnering with Myanmar to build the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway that will significantly improve transport links between Southeast Asia and South Asia. Once the highway is completed, Modi and his government also want to add connections to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, another clear rival to China’s BRI.

Furthermore, India has good relations with both Cambodia and Laos. In May, Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni visited India and the two sides reaffirmed “the strong civilizational bond” between the two nations. Phnom Penh and New Delhi cooperate on a variety of socio-economic projects, demining, water conservation and heritage protection. India’s engagement with Laos is less strong, but New Delhi and Vientiane are still likely to be discussing ways to boost economic ties. This is all the more notable as both Phnom Penh and Vientiane are considered to be firmly on China’s side.

Overall, India’s proactive Act East policy is also a net positive for the US Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at countering China. To further push New Delhi to do even more, the United States should also assist India in its infrastructure and development projects, as well as trade deals, which could help lessen Beijing’s economic dominance in Southeast Asia.

However, New Delhi’s policy of practical outreach to Southeast Asia – even if maintained only at current levels – would help weaken Beijing further.