Luke Coffey On How Tehran Has Adapted Kremlin Negotiation Tactics

WASHINGTON — As Washington weighs its next steps with Tehran, some analysts see familiar patterns emerging — not from the Middle East, but from the Kremlin’s playbook.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Luke Coffey, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute focusing on national security and transatlantic relations, said Iran appears to be borrowing directly from Russia’s negotiation strategy: Prolong talks, seek concessions incrementally, and avoid making meaningful commitments while maintaining the appearance of diplomacy.

RFE/RL: When you look at Iran’s response to recent peace proposals, do you see parallels with Russia’s approach to negotiations over Ukraine — publicly embracing diplomacy while privately hardening its demands?

Luke Coffey: There are a lot of similarities, because Iran has watched the [US special envoy Steve] Witkoff playbook over the past year or so with Russia. The Iranians know what they can get away with. They know how to drag the discussions out, make it look like Trump is achieving something, when in reality, he’ll achieve nothing. And they have learned this from the Russians.

RFE/RL: Both Moscow and Tehran want sanctions relief before making major concessions. Is that diplomacy or leverage politics dressed up as diplomacy?

Coffey: From their point of view, it makes sense to sequence it this way. They’re going to ask for this whether or not the Trump administration will lift sanctions beforehand remains to be seen.

In the case of Russia, you could argue that maybe the lifting of the oil sanctions on Russian crude oil — while many observers thought it was linked to global markets and Iran — was in fact a concession given to Russia by the Trump administration.

If I was Iran or Russia, I would want international sanctions lifted. I would want frozen assets released. But it would be a mistake to do so at this point because Russia is the aggressor here. In the case of Iran, Iran has a 47-year track record of conducting terrorism across the region, especially targeting US interests. It should be up to them to make the first move, not the United States.

RFE/RL: Russia wants frozen assets returned, while Iran wants access to frozen funds and economic normalization. How dangerous is it when negotiations become less about peace and more about financial recovery for authoritarian regimes?

Coffey: It’s a slippery slope, and this is one of the reasons why nothing should be agreed until everything is agreed when it comes to these peace talks, whether it’s with Russia or with Iran. Both will try to take whatever they can get while giving back the least amount required.

RFE/RL: Iran wants negotiations tied to Israel’s actions in Lebanon. Russia talks about addressing the “root causes” of its war in Ukraine. Is this the same tactic, expanding the conflict to avoid accountability?

Coffey: The situation is a bit different, because there are different motivating factors.

For Russia, this is about rebuilding an empire, and for Iran, it’s about spreading a revolution. If we were dealing with the Soviet Union, maybe there would be more similarity. But because we’re dealing with imperial Russia, the Russia we’re dealing with today is like it was during the time of the czar. We have a 21st-century Russia with 19th-century ambitions.

A similarity is this sense of almost ethnic superiority. Ethnic Russians think they are superior to the other constituent ethnic groups, whether inside the Russian Federation or those that used to be part of the Soviet empire, almost to a level of snobbery.

The same is the case with Iran and the Arabs, in particular the Gulf states, where the Persians see themselves as this established power — kind of like old money — and the Gulf states are these nouveau riche Arabs who don’t know how to behave or handle their newfound resources.

RFE/RL: You’ve spent years studying NATO and Russian strategy. Do you think Tehran concluded from the Ukraine war that persistence eventually exhausts the West politically?

Coffey: I think they do watch what’s happening in Ukraine. But I think they draw even more lessons from America’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and from the unwillingness — or lack of political appetite — to deploy US military forces on the ground in Iran.

They know that it’s very unlikely President Trump would agree to this, so they know they can probably ride out this war. They can absorb and withstand the bombardment, the bombings, and the air strikes and come out the other end surviving.

And for Iran, all they need to do is survive. They don’t necessarily need to win. If the US is unwilling to put boots on the ground, then achieving some of the objectives outlined by Trump seems really difficult, if not impossible.

RFE/RL: Trump recently called Iran’s latest response “totally unacceptable.” How much of this is Iran testing Washington — or testing Trump personally — because it believes the White House still wants a deal badly enough to stay at the table?

Coffey: Trump wants a deal, and Iran knows this. These Iranians are not stupid. These are very sophisticated, savvy people. They may be extremists, they may be Islamists, but they are not dumb, and they understand the political dynamics at play in America.

They understand midterm elections are coming up. They understand the summer holidays are coming up and that gasoline prices impact Americans.

They saw the latest inflation figures that were released — 3.8 percent, the highest rate of inflation in more than three years. So they are quite happy to remain in the status quo.

Yes, it’s difficult for them. Yes, they’re not generating much revenue. Yes, the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed for them, although you do hear stories of ships passing through the US blockade. But they’re willing to withstand this because, in their society, the way the state structures oppress and suppress the people means they can endure a terrible economic situation. They can withstand inflation in a way that elected leaders in the US cannot, because American politicians will be punished at the ballot box.

Trump talks about regime change. There are new people in Iran — and he says similar things about Maduro in Venezuela — but this isn’t really regime change. It is a leadership change while the regime itself remains fully intact. Maduro’s internal security apparatus, intelligence services, and armed forces remain intact, as if he were still there. The same is true with Iran. The tools used for internal oppression — the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps], for example — remain fully intact.

Yes, they have fewer missiles. They have fewer drones. They have fewer airplanes. They effectively have no navy. But the internal security structures remain. Until these are degraded, the people of Iran will not feel safe or comfortable taking to the streets. And this is the dilemma Trump will face going forward.

RFE/RL: At what point does diplomacy become performative? Critics argue that both Iran and Russia use negotiations as strategic delay mechanisms while continuing military pressure.

Coffey: You always run the risk that it becomes performative. Symbolism matters in international affairs, so perhaps negotiations are at least partly inherently performative, as both sides posture to try to get into a stronger negotiating position.

That’s why you need wise and experienced statesmen and stateswomen to determine when a deal can be made. When a deal cannot be made, you have to walk away from the table and start pursuing other policy options. But you have to know when you’re at that point, and you have to be realistic about it. And I’m not so sure this is exactly the case right now with the administration.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.