Issues of national interest, such as Kashmir, must always transcend political point scoring
Last week Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi publicly expressed Pakistan’s frustrations with the lack of support over Kashmir from Saudi Arabia-led Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC). Qureshi warned that if the OIC continued to stall a Kashmir-focused meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), Pakistan would be left with no option but to convene a meeting of the Islamic countries that are ready to support Pakistan over Kashmir. This rather unprecedented display of irreverence towards the Saudis has sparked a debate in Pakistan with Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the leading opposition party, leading the charge against the Foreign Minister’s statement. PML-N secretary general, Ahsan Iqbal, in a tweet in Arabic, condemned the Foreign Minister’s statement, while the party’s president termed the statement “highly unfortunate and irresponsibleâ€. To understand the motivations, hopes and objectives of either side, it is important to start by contextualising these statements with a historical background.
The Foreign Ministry Perspective
After India’s illegal unilateral annexation of Kashmir on August 5th last year, Pakistan launched a diplomatic offensive to internationalise the Kashmir issue. It is important to understand why this particular diplomatic charge is central to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Firstly, Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir is not just based on realpolitik; Pakistan’s insistence on a free and fair plebiscite across Kashmir has a very strong moral justification. Since partition, India has denied the people of Kashmir their inalienable right of self-determination, often through disproportionate use of force to suppress dissent. Today, Kashmir is the most militarised zone in the world and has been the site of gruesome human rights abuses frequently documented by independent international human rights organisations.
As pointed out by saner voices within India, the actions of last August have alienated even the minority pro-India sentiment that existed in Kashmir. The worsening human rights violations over the last year have also not gone unnoticed, with several neutral international publications putting India’s use of brute state force under the spotlight. Therefore, from Pakistan’s standpoint, this is the most opportune time to internationalise Kashmir and to highlight the human rights violations occurring in the valley. Over the last one year, Pakistan has been able to do this with mixed results; the prime minister’s speech at the United Nations General Assembly last year effectively highlighted Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint, while China, Turkey, Iran and Malaysia have backed Pakistan’s stance openly.
Nonetheless, despite multiple attempts Pakistan has failed to garner any support whatsoever from the Arab world. Without the diplomatic support of the OIC, the second largest intergovernmental body after the UN, and several influential Arab countries – that have historically followed Saudi Arabia’s lead when it comes to foreign policy – it would be impossible for Pakistan to successfully highlight the Kashmir issue internationally. Therefore, persuading Saudi Arabia to back Pakistan on Kashmir is exceedingly important for Pakistan at this time.
Several developments in the region as well as within the Muslim world have improved Pakistan’s diplomatic capital vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia. President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which Pakistan is an integral part, has expanded China’s economic and strategic influence across the region. China’s partnerships with Iran and Bangladesh have helped Pakistan improve ties with both these countries. Within the Muslim world, there is a growing disaffection towards Saudi Arabia’s role as the de facto leader of the Ummah. This discontent manifested itself in the Kuala Lumpur summit last year, where delegates of fifty-two Muslim countries, including some heads of states, were present. Since no high-level representatives from Saudi Arabia were invited, the summit was perceived to be a potential alternative to the Saudi-led OIC and therefore a challenge to Saudi Arabia’s role as the de facto leader of the Muslim world. Prime Minister Imran Khan, at that time, had canceled his trip to Kuala Lumpur at the last minute on Saudi insistence. These realignments in the region, and in the Muslim world, have allowed a revitalised Pakistan the opportunity to persuade a somewhat beleaguered Saudi Arabia to side with Pakistan on Kashmir. It is in this context that the foreign minister’s statement should be viewed.
The PML-N Perspective
The Sharif family and the Saudi royal family have a long history. Throughout the nineties, Saudi royals viewed Sharifs as a preferable alternative to Benazir Bhutto, because of the latter’s progressive inclinations. As later revealed by Saad Hariri, after the 1999 coup the Saudi royal family played a crucial role in securing Nawaz Sharif’s release from the prison and then hosted him at the famous Suroor palace for several years. During this time Sharif’s sons set up several businesses in the kingdom with the help of the Saudi royal family. The Sharif family is therefore indisputably indebted to the Saudis and is compromised to the extent that it cannot publicly take a position that would upset the Saudi royal family. Evidently this conflict of interest seems to be driving the decision-making at the highest levels of the party. Moreover, given Saudi Arabia’s historic influence in Pakistan’s politics, PML-N would not want to lose an international sympathiser that can potentially help their chances of coming back into government.
While it is the job of a political opposition to critique the government’s performance, issues of national interest, such as Kashmir, must always transcend political point scoring. It is however unfortunate that instead of formulating a united diplomatic front to convince Saudi Arabia to stand with Pakistan on Kashmir, the Sharifs and their party have chosen to return the countless personal favours of the Saudi royal family.