Secluded in his palace in Naypyitaw, Myanmar, Chief General Min Aung Hlaing must be suffering from apoplexy.
More than two years since they seized power in the February 1, 2021 coup, the military has yet to consolidate power. Despite vowing to crush the opposition, the junta leader recently had to acknowledge that 132 of Myanmar’s 330 townships (42 percent) were not under government control.
The shadow opposition National Unity Government, its People’s Defense Forces (PDF) and allied ethnic resistance organizations have fought back and enjoy overwhelming popular legitimacy.
The supply lines of the armed forces, through the once safe heartland of the ethnic Bamar majority, are increasingly vulnerable and casualties are mounting.
The exasperation of leaders is palpable and manifests itself in several key ways.
First, the armed forces have increased their attacks on civilians in an attempt to terrorize them into submission through collective punishment and reprisals. The army is waging a scorched earth campaign and has burned down more than 65,000 homes, 48,000 in sagaing alone.
The regime has intensified its use of air strikes, a blatant admission that they cannot deploy troops on the ground. And when they do, they will often drag civilians to serve as human shields.
Second, the regime has increased its reliance on pro-military militias and death squads.
Third, so desperate to defeat the NUG this year, the military increased its own budget by 51 percent, despite a moribund economy and dwindling revenue streams.
Fourth, the regime has increased its cash rewards for PDF members to surrender their weapons. These offers are clearly reserved and do not amount to blanket immunity, but the spending does take into account the rising poverty rates caused by the board’s mismanagement.
Fifth, when things go wrong, military leadership tends to micromanage.
In February, Min Aung Hlaing met Western Command leaders in Rakhine. The following month, he paid an inspection visit to the headquarters of the Northwestern Command which oversees the campaigns in Sagaing and Chin states.
The previous month, the junta placed 14 townships in Sagaing, five in Magway region and four in Chin state under martial law.
These trips outside of Naypyitaw are all the more remarkable because Min Aung Hlaing rarely leaves the fortress capitaland travels with a small army of bodyguards..
That is not a profile of bravery compared to acting NUG chairman Duwa Lashi La, who has made several trips to visit frontline troops.
Light Infantry Divisions
But one sign of unappreciated frustration is the turnover of commanders in the face of battlefield losses and failed offensives.
The Myanmar military is divided into 14 different Regional Commands and six Special Operations Offices.
The Myanmar army is smaller than often reported, approximately 150,000 troops, with the air force and navy adding 50-60,000 more personnel. However, only 70,000 are front-line troops.
Most of the kinetic operations are carried out by 10 Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs), which should have about 20,000 men in total, divided into approximately 100 battalions.
The light infantry battalions are the shock and amazement troops. They are the best armed and equipped, the most mobile and by far the most lethal. They are operating at reduced levels. According Ye Myo Heinmost of these have less than 150 men each, well below the already reduced floor of 200 men.
They are the troops the regime has relied on to achieve its strategic goals, including the 2017-2018 ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya. Today, the 99th LID, as the “ogre column” in Sagaing they do most of the scorched earth operations against civilians.
Most forces are territorial and deployed in static, defensive positions, where they are increasingly surrounded and harassed by PDF and ERO. Their resupply of food, ammunition and fuel is becoming more dangerous and sporadic.
Estimates of the current LID strength, given a conservative casualty rate of 15 percent, is around 16 to 17,000 men. Recruitment has slowed and the pace of troop operations is unsustainable.
All of this compounds poor performance on the battlefield and leadership frustration.
Even fewer restrictions on targeting
One of the most important indicators of regime frustration is the turnover of operational commanders.
Between February 2021 and July 2022, only two of the 14 regional military commanders rotated. As of August 2022, five have been replaced. Four others have since been rotated, including Maj-Gen Myat Thet Oo, commander of the South-East in March 2023. Two other lieutenant generals, Khin Hlaing and Thant Hlaing, who were overseeing operations in Karen and Sagaing states, have been fired. in February-March 2022.
Since October 2022, three commanders from the six Special Operations Offices, all lieutenant generals, have also been rotated.
At the operational level, there have been fewer turnovers in the last six months than expected. The commander of the 11th LID was promoted to commander of the Southeast Regional Military Command. But the heads of the 44 and 77 were transferred to non-operational quarters. The commander of LID 88 had a horizontal transfer to 77.
Part of this is the annual shakeup, although the pace has picked up in the last six months.
Almost all of these officers went on to non-operational positions, including at the Myanmar Economic Corporation or the Defense Services Academy of Technology. The board is careful to make sure everyone has soft landings.
The problems associated with the turnover of operational-level leaders are compounded by battlefield losses, which are not negligible. Between January 2023 and mid-May, 20 mid-level officers were killed, including four colonels, six lieutenant colonels, and 10 majors, according to open source reports.
While a sign of frustration, the turnover of commanders is bad news for the people of Myanmar. The replacements will be even more fawning and subservient under the leadership of the State Administrative Council. Fanaticism and the desire to prove yourself will lead to fewer restrictions on targeting.
While the NUG has outperformed militarily, it is fitting that the regime’s one-star colonels and generals, the people who actually have to run the war and who don’t get their fair share of the windfall of looted wealth that the SAC leaders are taking to realize that the war cannot be won.
The rotation of commanders should be one more reminder, not just a sign of leadership exasperation.
Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington and an adjunct at Georgetown University. The opinions expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the US Department of Defense, the National War College, Georgetown University or Radio Free Asia.
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