Southeast Asia is torn between feasibility and expediency | east asian for

Author: Cheng-Chwee Kuik, National University of Malaysia

Can Southeast Asian states continue to hedge as the US-China rivalry intensifies? To answer this question, a distinction must be made between the desirability and feasibility of ‘coverage‘ — active insurance-seeking behavior aimed at mitigating risks and cultivate alternative options under uncertainty. Wanting to protect itself is a matter of desirability, but whether a state is able to do so is a matter of feasibility.

Viability is conditioned primarily by structural circumstances: coverage is likely to end primarily if the US-China rivalry escalates into open confrontation, direct conflict, or all-out war. Then all bets would be off, as weaker states would be caught up in the conflict against their will.

There are also circumstances in which a state could voluntarily drop coverage, when a potential hazard becomes an immediate threat that the state must counter. and when there is reliable allied support capable of countering said threat, the state will switch to a full direct balance.

Unless these structural conditions prevail, states are likely to hedge for as long as possible. While hedging is not a panacea, there are three interrelated factors why Southeast Asian states still insist on doing it: shades of grey, concerns about a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the shadow of uncertainty.

Threat perceptions of Southeast Asian states are far from black and white. Rather, they perceive all the powers in’Shades of grey‘, as sources of problems and solutions to varying degrees. While Southeast Asian states, particularly those with overlapping claims in the South China Sea, perceive China as a source of threat and its defense partnerships with Western powers as essential support, these perceptions are mixed and ambivalent.

While China’s assertiveness is growing, it is not yet an immediate threat that must be countered at all costs. For most, if not all Southeast Asian states, there is a wide range of perceived problems and dangers that are more pressing than the ‘China challenge’.

China is still seen by the ASEAN states as a indispensable partner to address development and related issues. These are among the top priorities of the ruling elites in the ASEAN capitals because job creation, growth, stability, managing internal problems and electoral victory are the main paths to preserve their internal legitimacy. For ASEAN states, geographic proximity means that China is a permanent factor in external equations. While regional concerns are growing over tensions in the Taiwan Strait, not everyone in Southeast Asia equates ‘China in Asia’ with ‘Russia in Europe’.

While the United States is still seen as a vitally important partner, especially in the realm of security, its economic and diplomatic roles are seen as in relative decline, with its geopolitical acts occasionally seen as sources of apprehension and anxiety. Various US actions under the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy, from promoting Quad and AUKUS and making high-profile visits to Taiwan, to seeking economic decoupling, are perceived to be and technological, are driven more by their desire to preserve their primacy than to promote regional stability.

As militarily weaker players, Southeast Asian states want to take advantage of a stable balance of power to limit China’s actions. But faced with intensifying great power rivalry and an increasingly populous Indo-Pacific region, ASEAN states are becoming apprehensive that’restriction‘ could escalate towards containment. They are increasingly concerned about the dangers of a self-fulfilling prophecy: that China’s open identification as an adversary by some powers and the act of uniting with ‘like-minded’ nations could turn a potential danger into an imminent threat.

Some ASEAN states have been worried about AUKUS, not only because of its impact on nuclear non-proliferation, but also because of a possible arms race and escalation of tensions. As more non-ASEAN mechanisms such as Quad and AUKUS gain momentum, ASEAN states are also concerned that ASEAN centrality could be marginalized. There is growing fears that economic decoupling, despite being relabeled as ‘risk-off’, will lead to economic bifurcation and eventually, widespread polarization. The current cycles of action and reaction could lead to escalation, total containment, confrontation, conflict, and entrapment.

The ASEAN states do not want containment. If this happens, the weaker states will be the first to be affected, in part because their proximity to the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait would surely drag some of them into a war between the great powers.

The shadow of uncertainty in the region means that as power rivalries become more intense, rational states often deepen their protection due to a variety of ‘just in case’ scenarios. In Southeast Asia, uncertainty is tied to the possibility of an even more assertive China, the risk of Trump’s return, and any dramatic change in the configuration of global power. Hedging is fundamentally about the human instinct to mitigate multiple perceived risks under uncertain conditions.

Allowing Southeast Asian states to hedge is good for all powers. The coverage of Southeast Asia means that no state wants to side with one power against another. This helps ensure ASEAN neutrality, maintain the autonomy of Southeast Asia and prevent regional polarization, while maintaining space for countries with diverse interests to continue to forge inclusive regional cooperation. This is not an ideal situation for any of the giants. But precisely because this is not the best case scenario for either rival power, it is the next best case scenario for all under the current circumstances.

Cheng-Chwee Kuik is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for Asian Studies, Institute of Malaysian and International Studies, National University of Malaysia.

This article was developed based on the writer’s presentation in the Southeast Asia Regional geopolitical update at the Australian National University on May 1, 2023.