Tempering Expectations of an India-China ‘Reset’

India’s Minister for External Affairs S Jaishankar’s announcement that roughly 75 percent of India’s “disengagement problems” with China had been resolved has led to optimism about a possible “thaw” in India-China relations.

Recent Chinese moves signal that Beijing is also trying to assuage concerns about a volatile border. Reassuring the audience at a domestic press conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning said that the border situation was “generally stable and under control.” Recently, an Indian newspaper reported that Chinese Ambassador to India Xu Feihong highlighted how bilateral relations were at a “crucial stage of improvement.”

Several notable high-level engagements have taken place in recent weeks, including a meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit Doval on the sidelines of the on the sidelines of the BRICS NSA Meeting. The overall softening of rhetoric from both sides and uptick in diplomatic engagements is noteworthy, but one that warrants further investigation to determine if a “reset” is truly underway.

Firstly, it is important to contextualize Jaishankar’s remarks. The emphasis on “disengagement” rather than “de-escalation” is crucial here. As it currently stands, New Delhi and Beijing have successfully completed disengagement from five of the seven points since corps commander-level talks began in 2020. However, progress on talks concerning de-escalation remains elusive and has been deferred until complete disengagement is successful. So far, 31 rounds of talks have been held between India and China to resolve differences over the Line of Actual Control. The latest meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) was held in Beijing on August 29, where both sides reiterated the need for an “early resolution of the outstanding issues.” Notably, the meeting comes within a month of the 30th meeting, which was held in New Delhi. However, the corps commander level meeting, which is usually held between two WMCC meetings, is yet to be scheduled. The 21st round of the high-level military talks was last held on February 19, making the 7-month gap the longest since talks began in June 2020.

These meetings are crucial to chalk out the modalities of the agreements arrived at the diplomatic level. With no substantive progress achieved in the latest round of Corps Commander talks, more than 60,000 troops remain on each side of the border on regular deployment. Progress on disengagement has stalled since the last round took place in Patrolling Point (PP)-15 on July 17, 2022.

While there are expectations of a possible dis-engagement at Demchok, slow progress on the corps commander level talks indicates that diplomatic efforts are taking precedence over military discussions. As for Depsang Bulge, there are no signs of the two sides moving any closer to resolution.

After a long period of uncomfortable stalemate, the renewed diplomatic push is likely driven by external stimuli. With the BRICS summit less than a month away, these engagements indicate a desire by both sides to improve the diplomatic environment ahead of the multilateral engagement. With Russia holding the 2024 BRICS chairmanship under the motto “Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security” the summit focuses on “positive and constructive cooperation with all countries concerned.” With growing internal divisions within the BRICS — these came out in the open last year over the question of membership expansion — and concerns in New Delhi over the group becoming China-centric,  diplomatic engagements prior to the summit can be seen paving the way for smooth conduct of the meeting.

New Delhi-Beijing relations cannot be isolated from the complex regional environment in which they operate. The ongoing domestic political crisis in Myanmar since the military seizure of power in 2021 has resulted in an escalating civil war between the junta and pro-democracy forces. The looming risk of spillover throughout the region is a concern for both India and China. The overwhelming challenge of refugee inflows across the porous international borders of Myanmar — shared with both India and China — highlights how the multifaceted crisis poses a great threat to regional stability. This is not to suggest that India and China are comfortable with the other’s presence in the country, but simply acknowledge that the fallout of such regional crises shape both New Delhi and Beijing’s thinking about potential border escalation

Taking into account these two external developments, Beijing and New Delhi’s overtures are likely to be a routine temporary adjustment rather than a concrete step towards dispute resolution. Despite continued engagement, both India and China continue building infrastructure along the disputed border, leaving open the risk of localized military clashes. Escalating maritime tensions in East and South China Sea resulting in mounting tensions between China and the Philippines, Japan and Taiwan, may be pushing Beijing to calibrate its position on the LAC to deter New Delhi’s active involvement in the maritime dispute, at least temporarily. This works well for New Delhi, which has previously used the South China Sea issue to gain concessions from Beijing on the border issue.

It would be naïve to assume that a full resolution of disputes derailing Indo-China ties is on the horizon. Despite pressure from industry groups to explore opportunities for trade and investment with China, the security establishment is unlikely to change the status quo soon. Amidst speculations that the Indian government may be softening economic measures to bring in more FDI from China, based on the recommendation of the Economic Survey 2023-2024, Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal has confirmed that the government will not change its policy on foreign direct investments (FDI) from China. The ongoing recalibrations are not sudden, but a result of long-drawn negotiations and mutual accommodations driven by both domestic and external developments. However, a resolution that can only come from compromise and concession is still far-fetched.