Chinese President Xi Jinping, on four separate occasions in the past month, openly fixed that he is preparing China for war. In light of increasingly aggressive rhetoric from Beijing, the importance of Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) is becoming increasingly apparent. Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and India are key players in the IPS and represent a formidable coalition that can “maintain stability and reject coercive exercises of power” in the Pacific and Indian oceans.
However, the IPS has a significant weakness: the strategy’s alliance infrastructure is heavily biased toward the Pacific. The main focus of the IPS is on a possible Taiwan contingency in the South China Sea and does not address Beijing’s strategic advances in South Asia.
The current IPS is primarily based on India as a key partner within the Indian Ocean. India’s inclusion is certainly a positive, but the lack of additional IPS members in its neighborhood poses a significant weakness. Chinese military planners have realized this shortcoming and are increasingly challenging Indian hegemony in the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the Laccadive Sea.
In order to downplay China’s position, US politicians would do well to reconsider Pakistan’s inclusion in the IPS. The inclusion of Pakistan not only strengthens the overall US position but also limits Beijing’s expansion. While Pakistan’s inclusion will be a Herculean task in the face of Indian opposition, the alternative scenarios are much worse.
China’s recent successes in brokering a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, its rapidly growing military footprint in Pakistan and interoperability with Pakistani forces, the expansion of ground stations in Sri Lanka, and successful episodes of naval cooperation with Bangladesh and Myanmar expose areas of weakness. US beat to Bangladesh to minimize Chinese influence and maneuverability in the Bay of Bengal indicates that the Biden administration is not taking Beijing’s activities in the region lightly, but current measures are not enough in light of Chinese resolve.
In the Indian Ocean, the United States relies primarily on its partnership with the Indian Navy to support its IPS objectives. While significant improvements have been made in the India-US relationship, New Delhi continues to cling to the remnants of its former non-alignment policy, now renamed “strategic autonomy.” New Delhi’s reluctance to fully embrace Washington, coupled with the Indian military’s confidence in Russian military platforms, gives Washington politicians pause. While the trust deficit is expected to diminish over time, significant work is still required.
In terms of capabilities, the Indian Navy acts as a sizeable naval force capable of deterring Chinese subversive actions in its immediate vicinity. However, the Indian Navy and its hardware are increasingly outclassed by the Beijing navy. capabilities in case of a hot conflict.
In addition to the mismatch in naval capabilities, Beijing has also strategically supplied subsidized warships and provided maritime infrastructure expertise to build the nascent naval capabilities of both. bangladeshi and burma. The most recent delivery of a Russian-made submarine to the Tatmadaw, as well as the construction of the deep-water port at Kyaukphyu, illustrate significant Chinese attempts to expand its influence in New Delhi’s backyard. Last months opening of the SNB Sheikh Hasina south of Dhaka, as well as the handover of two Chinese-made submarines, challenges India’s influence in Dhaka. The transfer of naval equipment and training of Bengali and Myanmar naval personnel also gives Beijing the advantage of stationing Chinese naval personnel in the Bay of Bengal.
rumors of Bangladesh’s acceptance of the IPS are significant, but are undermined by the recent political rhetoric of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Bangladesh’s inclusion in the IPS adds a marginal benefit to the alliance’s network, but is unlikely to change the country’s long tradition of non-alignment and self-rule. Lastly, Bangladesh’s limited naval capability is unlikely to change the underlying power imbalance between Chinese and Indian naval capabilities.
In South India, much has been written about Chinese activities in Sri Lanka. New Delhi continues to enjoy significant influence in Colombo, but is increasingly challenged by China. The impact of Chinese diplomatic efforts and rumors of Chinese-led construction of a military installation in the Cocos Islands threaten Indian influence within Sri Lanka as well as the surrounding maritime area.
At the northwestern edge of the Indian Ocean, Chinese efforts are also significant. a recent report by the US Institute of Peace noted that Chinese platforms would make up about 50 percent of Pakistan’s major military platforms by 2030. In addition, the number of joint Sino-Pakistan military exercises has grown more and more in frequency. and complexity. The report suggests that Beijing’s arms transfers strategically increase the degree of interoperability between the two militaries.
As interoperability between the two forces continues to increase along with the complexity and frequency of joint military exercises, the risk that Pakistan will allow Beijing unrestricted access to its naval and air facilities also increases. The likelihood of Chinese warships operating from Gwadar or Karachi remains largely hypothetical, but the potential for such an eventuality threatens to radically undermine New Delhi’s position and subsequently the strength of the IPS. A Chinese naval presence in both the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea would divide New Delhi’s attention and resources.
To combat Chinese efforts, US politicians need to review Pakistan’s inclusion in the IPS. Considering Pakistan’s inclusion in the IPS as Islamabad becomes increasingly dependent on Beijing for its security and technological needs certainly poses a security risk. Not long ago, Washington’s interests in Afghanistan were undermined by Pakistani generals. However, the inclusion of Pakistan, even at a minimal level, in the IPS would signal to Beijing that its “silver bullet” is not as safe as you would like to believe.
Furthermore, if Washington were to successfully re-engage military-to-military ties with Pakistan, it would not only prevent a major non-NATO ally from falling completely into China’s orbit, but would also signal to a lukewarm India that Washington is willing to use a wide range of tools and alliances to meet your security concerns and you won’t be subjected to double standards as you continue to engage with Russia.
While recent developments in the China-Pakistan relationship are likely to discourage policymakers in Washington from going after Pakistan in the IPS, the risk of allowing Pakistan to fall completely into Beijing’s orbit is far greater. It is much better to have some influence than none. Opponents of Pakistan’s inclusion in the IPS are likely to argue that Islamabad is unlikely to support the IPS because it would damage its relations with Beijing. While Pakistan would be forced to strike a delicate balance if it were included in the IPS framework, the generals in Rawalpindi would relish the opportunity to protect themselves between the US and China.
It should be understood that Pakistan’s dependence on China is not necessarily a relationship to be preferred to one with the United States, but rather one of necessity. While the relationship with Beijing has been helpful to Rawalpindi, Pakistan’s security and political establishment has always been more comfortable dealing with the West. After all, the official language of Pakistan is English. But due to its international isolation, economic problems and fallout with Washington, Pakistan has been forced to rely on expensive financial support and below military hardware made in China.
Despite the fact that Beijing came to their aid, the heart of the Pakistani political and military establishment resides in Washington. Islamabad and Rawalpindi have realized that their love affair with Chinese investment was myopic and they have slowly moved back to the center in trying to re-engage with the West.
In the next decade, the United States will see increasing levels of competition in the Indian Ocean. Washington’s ever-closer ties with New Delhi have only reinforced Beijing’s perception that the US IPS is just an attempt to contain China. Furthermore, Pakistan’s exclusion from the IPS and minimal cooperation with Washington have only pushed it closer to its northeast neighbor. Washington politicians would do well to re-engage Pakistan through the IPS.
There is no doubt that there will be significant Indian opposition to such a development. New Delhi will not easily tolerate the inclusion of Pakistan. However, the idea of Chinese warships operating from Karachi or Gwadar should provide enough of an incentive to prefer Pakistan’s inclusion.
