Lucas Schramm is a researcher in political science at Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich.
The European Council recently confirmed that little, if anything, in the European Union moves without consent between France and Germany.
French-German controversies have been at the core of the energy issue for weeks now. But it’s not unusual for these two countries to adopt different stances at the onset of an EU crisis — nor for them to criticize each other. One might even argue that initial French-German differences are a precondition for later European compromises, as the two nations often represent the overall spectrum of member countries’ preferences.
What is disturbing in the present case, however, is that policymakers from both countries are debating bilateral disagreements publicly — and in an aggressive manner.
Facing an escalating energy crisis, national leaders professed solidarity and pledged common action at the European Council last month. Their conclusions, however, remain full of vague and ambiguous formulations, notably on the “dynamic” price corridor for gas, essentially instructing the European Commission to come up with proposals for more ambitious and concrete measures.
Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron went so far as to call Germany “isolated,” and in return, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz cancelled a planned bilateral meeting of ministers.
What a difference compared to the COVID-19 crisis of just two years ago!
Back in early 2020, France and Germany were again in disagreement, this time on the bloc’s fiscal response to the pandemic. While France called for the joint issuing of government bonds, Germany at first insisted on using existing financial instruments instead. Importantly, however, then Chancellor Angela Merkel and Macron came to recognize that a common European response was imperative — not only financially but also to send a signal of political unity — and they later presented the blueprint for what would become the EU’s NextGeneration recovery plan.
The current energy crisis, by contrast, seems to be a more complicated task, as it involves several policy dimensions, including geopolitical questions and matters of energy security, supply and prices. And historically speaking, French-German bilateralism — as well as its potential to forge larger European compromises —has always had a more difficult time when several policy dimensions are involved.
In this instance, one cannot help but recall the 1973 oil crisis, where French-German clashes similarly prevented a coordinated European response.
Following the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli “Yom Kippur” War in early October 1973, the West’s oil-consuming countries — including the European Economic Community (EEC) — faced rising prices thanks to production cuts. Arab countries sought to use oil as a weapon to divide the EEC and push its member countries to take a more critical stance toward Israel.
Strategically distinguishing between “friendly,” “neutral,” and “unfriendly” countries, the Arab nations subjected the Netherlands to a full oil embargo as the only EEC member country, which led the Dutch government — along with the European Commission — to plead for European solidarity and the sharing of oil.
However, members couldn’t agree on an oil-sharing mechanism. More concerned about securing oil supplies, Germany echoed Dutch calls for greater solidarity, while France advocated for bilateral contracts with oil-producing countries. It argued that any intra-European sharing would only provoke the Arab countries and lead to further price hikes. And at the Washington Energy Conference just a few months later, German Finance Minister Helmut Schmidt bluntly told French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert his country had the necessary financial means and was willing to pay higher prices.
One finds remarkable parallels to current discussions here, as much like today, different French and German approaches, priorities and economic philosophies prevented a European agreement. And next to energy itself, the 1973 oil crisis had an important foreign policy dimension too.
France suggested a common European front and direct dialogue between Arab producer countries and European consumer countries. Initiating the Euro-Arab dialogue, it insisted on a common mandate for the Washington Energy Conference. Germany, meanwhile, favored the idea of a transatlantic consumer cartel, as suggested by United States President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. And although speaking in his capacity as president-in-office of the EEC Council, then German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel publicly supported the U.S. proposals, leading Jobert to designate his European colleagues as “traitors.”
Without France joining the U.S.-sponsored International Energy Agency — which was formally established in November 1974 — the Continent was perfectly split on energy and foreign policy.
Of course, the lack of European coordination and action was costly. Although hindsight suggests the EEC didn’t face an existential shortage in supply, oil prices still quadrupled. Political unity proved elusive too. Angry at the lack of solidarity, the Netherlands threatened to reduce the export of gas to European partners from the Groningen fields. And in a climate of distrust, planned integration projects — such as the transition to a European monetary union and the creation of a regional fund supporting the poorer areas of Europe — proved unrealistic.
The experience of the 1973 oil crisis shows that energy challenges can hugely undermine European unity, and the popular notion of Europe emerging stronger from every crisis is far from certain. Thus, it’s important that member countries — France and Germany in particular — develop a common vision and objective for addressing the current energy crisis.
Europe needs bilateral initiatives, followed by compromises. Concretely speaking, this means determined and fast attempts to limit gas prices — and on this, primarily Germany must move. At the same time, France should withdraw its resistance to a true European energy market — including pipelines crossing its territory — while joint purchasing of gas would help too.
But before anything else, the public bashing needs to stop.
