On 27 January 2026, in the shadow of the free trade agreement (FTA) labelled the ‘mother of all deals’, India and the EU also signed the Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) Agreement. It serves as a critical roadmap for security and defence industrial cooperation in India-EU relations amid an uncertain geopolitical environment. The SDP primarily aims to foster cooperation in defence, maritime security, and emerging security frontiers, including counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence (AI), and other emerging technologies. The SDP builds on various pre-existing initiatives, including the 2004 ‘Strategic Partnership’, the ‘EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025’, and the India-EU Strategic Dialogue on Foreign and Security Policy launched in June 2025, which institutionalised dialogue on security and defence alongside other areas of cooperation. The SDP provides a renewed political push and a strategic framework to enhance India-EU defence and industrial cooperation.
Strategic Contexts for Convergence
For New Delhi, the 2020 Galwan crisis with China and the four-day episode with Pakistan in May 2025 define the contours of its strategic threat environment. Both China and Pakistan share a structural rivalry with India. Moreover, the deepening of China-Pakistan strategic cooperation has reinforced a ‘no-war, no-peace’ environment, placing significant pressure on New Delhi to develop a robust deterrence posture. In the medium to long term, expanding maritime cooperation between China and Pakistan could pose a serious challenge to India in the Indian Ocean Region.
The SDP builds on various pre-existing initiatives, including the 2004 ‘Strategic Partnership’, the ‘EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025’, and the India-EU Strategic Dialogue on Foreign and Security Policy launched in June 2025, which institutionalised dialogue on security and defence alongside other areas of cooperation.
In May 2025, India’s Operation Sindoor highlighted the limitations of its defence supply chains, which, although diversified, remain disproportionately reliant on a few core partners, particularly Russia. The ongoing war in Ukraine disrupted Russia-based defence supplies to New Delhi. Consequently, several frontline platforms — including the Su-30 MKI, MiG-29M aircraft, assorted helicopters, transport aircraft and mid-air refuellers, submarines, and tanks — have experienced delays, particularly during periods of heightened military readiness amid an adverse threat environment. India, as a consequence, has begun reassessing its excessive reliance on Russia as a defence partner.
Europe, on the other hand, faces a serious security challenge from Russia, with threat perceptions rising sharply since Moscow’s war against Ukraine. The need to strengthen defence readiness and maintain a credible deterrence posture has become a central policy driver. Washington’s demand that allies take greater responsibility for their defence and increase their military spending, coupled with doubts over Trump’s commitment to European security, have emerged as other key drivers. To meet evolving security demands, the EU has been diversifying its network of security partnerships. These partnerships are aimed at addressing concerns related to military readiness and strengthening the defence-industrial base across member states. Beyond India, the EU has already concluded defence partnership agreements with South Korea and Japan. Together, these partnerships help bridge two geostrategic theatres and reflect Europe’s growing integration with Indo-Pacific partners and the wider region.
Elements of the India-EU Defence Industrial Partnership
India, guided by the principle of strategic autonomy, has pursued a multi-alignment strategy to advance its foreign and security policy objectives. In the defence domain, New Delhi has gradually diversified its sources of military procurement, particularly through big-ticket purchases from major defence contractors.
Beyond India, the EU has already concluded defence partnership agreements with South Korea and Japan. Together, these partnerships help bridge two geostrategic theatres and reflect Europe’s growing integration with Indo-Pacific partners and the wider region.
Since the war in Ukraine, Russia’s global arms exports, according to the SIPRI database, have seen a significant decline. These trends are also reflected in New Delhi’s defence imports from Russia. Between 2020 and 2024, Russia constituted 36 percent of India’s defence imports, compared to 49 percent during the 2016-2020 period. On the other hand, imports from European partners, particularly France, have seen a notable rise. French platforms accounted for 18 percent of India’s defence imports between 2016 and 2020, while the 2020-2024 period saw this share increase to 33 percent. Israel and the United States remain other major defence suppliers to India.
The signing of an additional procurement deal for 114 Rafale jets would further increase the share of defence imports from Europe and deepen long-term integration with the European defence ecosystem. Of the 114 aircraft, 90 Rafale jets are expected to be manufactured in India with close to 50 percent indigenous content. In addition, France’s Safran has hinted at establishing an engine assembly line in India to fast-track Rafale production. This would further materialise existing interoperability and support strategic convergence in the Indian Ocean Region.
An assembly line for H125 helicopters, including a military variant, has been established in Bengaluru by Airbus in partnership with Tata Advanced Systems Limited. To further strengthen joint venture efforts, Bharat Electronics Limited and Safran have also signed an agreement for the local production of the HAMMER air-to-ground weapon system.
New Delhi is also negotiating a Type-214 submarine deal with Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) to build air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines. The Rafale deal and the submarine negotiations with Germany reflect that, although India’s defence industrial base has strengthened, it remains reliant on imports of components and sophisticated systems. Despite the renewal of a 10-year defence agreement with the United States, New Delhi’s strategic partnership with a Trump-led America remains marked by uncertainty. To this end, India appears to prefer and may increasingly turn to Europe to diversify its major defence systems.
The Tata Group’s collaboration with Airbus is underway to manufacture C295 military transport aircraft, with an order for 40 units to be delivered to the Indian Air Force by 2031. Safran, in collaboration with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), aims to produce aero-engines with 100 percent technology transfer for the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) project.
India’s strategic turn towards establishing a credible and mutually beneficial defence partnership with Europe is aimed at securing greater autonomy and improving the reliability of defence supplies. New Delhi’s effort to diversify defence purchases and cooperation would help plug critical operational gaps.
At the same time, India has developed an indigenous lead in several capabilities, including missiles, drones, and air defence systems, which have gained export traction in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor. The SDP provides India access to the EU’s €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative. SAFE enables EU member states to undertake common procurement of ammunition, artillery, air defence systems, drones, and other equipment, presenting opportunities for New Delhi. The mechanism requires at least 65 percent EU-origin components, while non-EU partners such as India are capped at 35 percent participation. Consequently, SAFE’s emphasis on strengthening the European defence industrial base may translate into limited gains for India’s defence industry.
Overall, the EU could bring expertise for joint ventures or co-production models in advanced naval propulsion, aerospace components, electronic warfare suites, and precision munitions, among other areas. India’s defence reforms and the integration of private-sector stakeholders under the ‘Make in India’ initiative would better facilitate the development of a manufacturing hub for European defence firms. Saab, a Swedish arms company, has already established a manufacturing unit in Haryana to produce Carl-Gustaf M4 weapon systems. India’s L&T has entered into a joint venture with MBDA Missile Systems Limited to manufacture anti-tank guided missiles and Sea Ceptor surface-to-air missiles.
India’s strategic turn towards establishing a credible and mutually beneficial defence partnership with Europe is aimed at securing greater autonomy and improving the reliability of defence supplies. New Delhi’s effort to diversify defence purchases and cooperation would help plug critical operational gaps. Simultaneously, the Indian defence industrial ecosystem would be better positioned to utilise opportunities for joint ventures and technology transfer with diverse stakeholders across Europe.
Amid questions regarding US commitment to the European security architecture, the EU, under its ReArm Europe Plan for Military Readiness 2030, seeks to reduce external dependence (particularly on the United States) for defence and security. India’s potential as a manufacturing hub, supported by a large pool of skilled labour, represents another favourable factor for defence industrial cooperation. These advantages could translate into quality-based, cost-effective, and time-bound delivery of defence products. However, given the parallel emphasis on localisation of defence production on both sides, there remains a need to establish greater synergy between the ‘Make in India’ and ‘Made in Europe’ initiatives.
Implementation Challenges for the India-EU SDP
The India-EU Security and Defence Partnership agreement clearly reflects a geopolitical push to create reliable frameworks for defence and industrial cooperation. Foremost, divergences in India’s and the EU’s approaches towards Russia and China may require greater understanding and assurances from both sides. India’s ‘Make in India’ and the EU’s ‘Made in Europe’ initiatives will also need better alignment to enable enhanced cooperation. The question of compliance related to third-party defence exports will demand serious attention to align with India’s defence export ambitions.
Foremost, divergences in India’s and the EU’s approaches towards Russia and China may require greater understanding and assurances from both sides. India’s ‘Make in India’ and the EU’s ‘Made in Europe’ initiatives will also need better alignment to enable enhanced cooperation.
Although the initial phase of cooperation has a stronger focus on defence production, the transfer of technology (ToT) required for joint ventures and co-development may remain a significant challenge for New Delhi. Such a model would enable India to achieve credible co-production with European counterparts. India and the EU could create an iCET-like framework to strengthen defence innovation and move beyond the prevailing ‘build-to-print’ model. The existing EU-India Trade and Technology Council remains insufficient to fully address the defence agenda.
Politically, the EU is not a monolith. New Delhi will need to navigate the political convergence enabled by the EU-led SDP alongside bilateral engagements with individual EU member states. Each relationship will demand varying degrees of diplomatic effort and is likely to produce diverse outcomes.
Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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