Iranian President Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi’s three-day trip to Pakistan from April 22-24, is being hailed as a major diplomatic milestone by Pakistan. This visit, the first by any foreign leader to Pakistan since the hotly disputed elections on February 8 — which were riddled with accusations of fraud and misconduct — takes on added significance against the backdrop of escalating Middle Eastern geopolitical tensions involving Israel and Iran. Meanwhile, Tehran and Islamabad, through a strategically staged military display in January 2024 — largely viewed as a manoeuvre to satisfy domestic political agendas — have further intensified their international presence.
For both nations, this visit represents a critical moment as they navigate a labyrinth of significant internal and external pressures. For Pakistan, particularly its military brass, this event is a strategic gambit to balance against traditional allies like the Gulf states and the United States, aiming to extract enhanced financial perks—a tactic honed over decades. Hosting Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi as the first foreign leader post its contentious elections also highlights Islamabad’s growing geopolitical isolation and diminishing influence, even within its own region.
Pakistan is besieged by relentless challenges: its economy is shattered, security is irreparably compromised, and its foreign policy — especially regarding Afghanistan — has come apart at the seams. The nation’s economy, gasping for air, clings desperately to intermittent bursts of foreign aid. In March 2024, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) dispensed its latest loan instalment, staving off Islamabad’s imminent balance of payment crisis. With external debt towering at an overwhelming $131 billion, Islamabad spends nearly three-quarters of its government revenue on servicing this mountainous debt annually.
Similarly, Islamabad’s Afghan policy has disintegrated just two years after aiding the Afghan Taliban’s ascension in Kabul; a manoeuvre once hailed by many in Pakistan as a regional policy victory. The subsequent deterioration in Islamabad-Kabul relations underscores the flawed and absurd assumptions that colluding with a guerrilla group to supplant an established republican government and shatter the nation’s fabric could yield long-term benefits. This stark failure speaks volumes about the misguided strategy’s repercussions.
For Iran, long branded an international outcast primarily due to its controversial nuclear program and Middle Eastern policies, this visit is a chance to bolster or at least project a strengthening of its regional alliances and assert its influence amid escalating tensions with Israel and the United States. Furthermore, Tehran has executed its most daring military manoeuvre in the volatile Middle East by carrying out its widely publicised direct military strike against Israel, its regional arch-enemy. This response came after Tel Aviv’s airstrike on Iran’s consulate in Damascus, which resulted in the deaths of several of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards senior commanders, including Mohammed Reza Zahedi and Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi. In a situation where Israel is urgently trying to expand the conflict from Gaza to a wider arena, Iran sees securing a visit to Pakistan — a nation viewed through the lens of American influence due to its pivotal role in the US-led war on terror — as a strategic advantage.
Pakistan’s alignment within the Western sphere of influence has stymied any potential for a mutually beneficial relationship with Iran, breeding mutual distrust as both nations viewed each other through this ideological lens. This estrangement is evident in their dismal economic exchanges. For instance, in 2022, Iran-Pakistan bilateral trade was barely under $800 million; a figure embarrassingly low considering the economic potential. This grim reality has most likely spurred the Iranian president during his visit to commit to boosting Iran-Pakistan trade to $10 billion within the next five years.
Reflecting on the unsatisfactory state of their economic ties, President Raisi declared during a joint press conference with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on April 22, “The economic and trade volume between Iran and Pakistan is not at all acceptable. We have decided as a first step to increase the trade volume between our two countries to $10 billion.”
However, Islamabad’s longstanding capitulation to pressures from the United States and Gulf monarchies to maintain distance from Tehran casts serious doubts on the achievability of this modest goal. Without such pressures, Pakistan could have leveraged international sanctions against Iran to its benefit, much like the Dubai Emirate in the UAE, positioning itself as a gateway for Iran’s international economic dealings rather than as a US ally in containing Iran. Such a mutually beneficial relationship could have significantly mitigated the substantial economic woes both nations face, including inflation, unemployment, and currency devaluation.
Pakistan’s inability is highlighted by its failure to complete its segment of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, with Islamabad unable to persuade Washington to greenlight its involvement in the project. Notably, Tehran has fulfilled its commitment by extending the Asalouyeh-Iranshahr pipeline up to the Pakistan border. What could more profoundly illustrate Pakistan’s predicament than the dismal situation its military-led establishment has created, where the nation must seek approval from its American patrons to pursue its own national interests? Despite frequent public declarations by Pakistani leaders to kickstart the project, there remains a deep scepticism about the Pakistani establishment’s readiness to defy American dominance and align more closely with Iran, making the project’s realisation in the near future highly improbable.
Furthermore, a deep-rooted mutual distrust has plagued relations between the two countries, with each accusing the other of harbouring terrorist factions that launch attacks on their territories. For example, Tehran has repeatedly accused Pakistan of providing refuge to anti-Iranian Sunni extremist groups like Jaish Al Adl, which have launched numerous attacks in Iran’s Balochistan and Sistan provinces. This was cited as the justification for Iran’s airstrikes on January 16 in Pakistan’s Balochistan region at Panjgur. Similarly, Islamabad, suspecting Iran’s support for Baloch insurgents, justified its missile strikes on January 18 as targeting these groups. However, accusations persist that Tehran and Islamabad utilise the terrorism narrative and subsequent military responses as pretexts, allowing both governments to cater to their domestic audiences and sidestep external pressures.